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In times of public money shortage, it is not too astonishing that subsidiza-
tion of the performing arts is a hotly debated issue in countries possessing
a signiﬁcant public performing arts sector such as France, Germany and the
UK.1 A glance at the “oﬃcial” statistics of Germany’s 151 public theaters
published by the Deutscher Buehnenverein (2002) reveals that the sector re-
ceived public subsidies amounting to 2.1 billione in the 2001/02 season. On
the other hand, box oﬃce returns and other revenues covered only 16.1 % of
the theaters’ total operating costs. These ﬁgures correspond to a subsidy of
96e per ticket sold — this is a large amount set in relation to an average
ticket price of less than 11e. Moreover, the 26 million seats oﬀered by Ger-
man theaters in the course of the season attracted not more than 19 million
spectators, equivalent to a utilization of capacity of less than 75 %.
Since Baumol and Bowen’s (1966) seminal book “Performing Arts: The
Economic Dilemma” the economics of the performing arts has progressed a
lot. The vast transfer of public funds into the performing arts sector has trig-
gered a debate not only on the causes but also on the economic justiﬁcation
of subsidization in general. We do not want to embark on this debate here
but refer to Throsby’s (1994) and Blaug’s (2001) surveys on cultural econo-
mics for details. Understandably, as the subject started with Baumol’s “cost
disease” hypothesis, this literature focusses primarily on costs structures in
the performing arts sector and on the extent of possible externalities of the
performing arts for the beneﬁt of the society.
Relatively little attention has been paid so far to the behavior of the
1In contrast to their European counterparts US performing arts organizations are nor-
mally ﬁnanced by private donations rather than public subsidies. For such models see the
classical papers by Hansmann (1981) and Steinberg (1986).
1relevant decision makers on the supply side of the performing arts market,
i.e., the local politicians and the managers of the performing arts organiza-
tions (henceforth abbreviated PAO). A notable exemption to this is Krebs
and Pommerehne (1995) who studied the interactions between demand for
the performing arts, grantors of public funds and PAO managers in a pu-
blic choice framework. Their theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that
PAO managers are biased towards artistic goals and therefore aspire after a
large share of “highbrow productions”, being constrained, however, by public
decision makers who make the grant of subsidies contingent on capacity utili-
zation. Schulze and Rose (1998) analyzed local politicians’ decision behavior
with respect to performing arts subsidization using a data set for 49 German
symphony and chamber orchestras.
Seaman (2004) pointed to a further aspect of the performing arts sector
that has largely been neglected so far. As empirical research has shown that
operating a PAO involves huge ﬁxed costs,2 most authors have taken for
granted that the performing arts can be seen as a natural monopoly. Hence,
(spatial) interaction between PAOs in terms of competition for public funds,
audience etc., is an understudied domain.3
This paper is an attempt to ﬁll some of these gaps. We present a positive
2Diminishing average costs in the provision of seat capacity were documented, for ex-
ample, by Baumol and Bowen (1966) for US symphony orchestras, Globerman and Book
(1972, 1977) for Canadian theaters and orchestras, Lange et al. (1985) and Lange and
Luksetich (1993) for Australian symphony orchestras, Gray (1992) for Norwegian thea-
ters, Hjorth–Andersen (1992) for Danish theaters and Krebs (1996) for German theaters.
3In contrast to this, a large body of literature exists on competition among local public
governments with respect to a large array of parameters such as local tax competition and
the provision of local public goods. For a recent game–theoretic analysis of spatial com-
petition in the investment on public facilities see Takahashi (2004). See also the literature
stated therein.
2analysis of the performing arts sector. Taking up Blaug’s (2001) plead for
more models “in the spirit of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘muddling through’ ”
(p. 132), we consider the behavior of some of the agents involved in the
public provision of the performing arts. The art director sets performance
quality according to her aspiration level. Given the quality investment of
the art director, the administrative director seeks to minimize the PAO’s
losses,4 thereby ignoring that she competes with other PAOs for audience.
We explicitly take into account the spatial structure of the performing arts
sector, i.e., the distribution of PAOs and their potential audiences on the
map. The model is tested empirically using a spatial data set of all German
PAOs and municipalities. Indeed, administrative directors seem to take into
account the spatial distribution of the population in calculating ticket prices
by allowing for travel costs; yet our data supports our initial hypothesis that
they largely ignore competition. It is shown that, in zones where the sales
areas of PAOs overlap, those PAOs that take higher ticket prices than their
neighbors make higher losses. Furthermore, our parameter estimates suggest
that the art director invests too many funds in quality.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we present the
theoretical model. The model is tested empirically in Section 3. Section 4
concludes the paper.
4With this respect our model is similar to Hansmann’s (1981) model of US performing
arts organizations. Hansmann shows that a quality-maximizing non-proﬁt ﬁrm chooses
the audience size (via the price) that maximizes its net revenue. The diﬀerence is that we
replaced quality-maximizing by quality-satisfying behavior.
32 The Model
Spatial Structure
We consider a country comprising N large cities Ui, i ∈ L = {1,...,N}, and
n small cities ur, r ∈ S = {1,...,n}. Large cities are inhabited by Mi citizens;
small cities exhibit a population of mr. The spatial location of large and small
cities is denoted by Gi and gi, respectively, where locations are vectors of
latitude and longitude. PAOs are exclusively operated by large cities due to
cost reasons. Furthermore, we assume that every large city operates exactly
one public facility, i.e., we do not study intra-city competition.5 Citizens of
small cities have to commute to large cities in order to utilize their services.
It is assumed that commuters are constrained in their reach by time and
travel costs, where b denotes the maximum reach of a citizen in kilometers or
miles, respectively.6 dr,i denotes the distance between small city r and large
city i.7
We deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1 (Commuter Belt) Large city i’s commuter belt is given by
the set of small cities Bi = {ur : dr,i ≤ b,r ∈ S}.
and
5However, in the empirical part of the paper, we control for possible eﬀects of intra-city
competition.
6Note that we implicitly assume independence of maximum reach and ticket price. This
is admittedly unrealistic but keeps the model tractable.
7Assuming that Earth is a perfect globe, the distance between small city ur and large
city Ui is given by dr,i = D × arccos[sin(`ar)sin(`ai) + cos(`ar)cos(`ai)cos(`oi − `or)],
where D has to be replaced by 6378.399 kilometers or 3954.607 miles, respectively, and `a
and `o stand for latitude and longitude in degrees.
4Deﬁnition 2 (Choice Set) Small city r’s choice set is given by the set of
large cities Cr = {Ui : dr,i ≤ b,i ∈ L}.
Let #Cr denote the size of r’s choice set. In what follows, we consider only
small cities with #Cr > 0, that is, with nonempty choice set. Obviously,
if #Cr ≥ 2, the commuter belts of two or more large cities must overlap,
establishing spatial links between large cities.
Deﬁnition 3 (Spatial Link) A spatial link between any two large cities i
and j exists if Bi ∩ Bj 6= ∅, that is, there is at least one small city ur such
that {Ui,Uj} ⊆ Cr.
Cost Function
Performing arts organization is an umbrella term for both a public facility
(buildings, technical equipment, etc.) and its administration and manage-
ment. As to the more technical side, we assume that the facility provides a
particular service — theatrical performances, where the term theater hence-
forth is used in a generic sense for all performing arts such as theaters, operas,
operettas, musicals, and ballets. In order that the service can be experienced
by the audience, it is necessary that a facility, usually a playhouse, exists.
While it may be an interesting problem apart to study the capacity choice of
the facility, we assume that the facility’s capacity, in terms of seats, is exoge-
nously given by ¯ Zi. Since a playhouse is needed to “consume” a performance,
potential attendants are easily excluded from consumption at the theater’s
entrance door or box oﬃce. Moreover, additional spectators do not harm
present attendants’ consumption as long as ticket demand does not exceed
the facility’s capacity limit.8 Seen from this perspective, the performing arts
8Note that this is only a simplifying assumption. Traub and Missong (2005) modelled
the performing arts as a congestible public good. For the same data set, they obtained an
5can be considered as an excludable public good.
The problem of quality choice of publicly supplied goods has been studied
with many diﬀerent connotations of the term quality, and the same quality
connotation can be modelled diﬀerently. For example, one could deﬁne “goods
of diﬀerent quality as diﬀerent goods” (B¨ os et al. 1982, p. 289). Modelling
quality as product diﬀerentiation is an approach that was taken by Hohaus
et al. (1994) in a Hotelling model of local public goods supply. In contrast to
this, B¨ os et al. (1982) captured quality diﬀerences, for example, by a quality
indicator (see also Spence 1975). Our own approach resembles that of B¨ os
et al. insomuch as we measure quality by a (nonnegative real–valued) index
number Qi.
But how can we ﬁll such an index in a sector like the performing arts whe-
re quality is perhaps more central than elsewhere? Studies on the perception
of quality in the performing arts sector are numerous. The classical reference
to this is Throsby and Withers (1979) who compiled a large catalogue of qua-
litative output measures such as the source material, the technical standard
of a performance and its beneﬁts to the audience, the society and the spe-
ciﬁc form of art. Throsby (1990) used press reviews, i.e., expert opinions, to
assess the quality of three theater companies in Sydney. In a recent econome-
tric study, Tobias (2004) linked expert opinions to economic data on public
theaters. He found that dimensions that do not correlate with economic va-
riables (e.g. the esthetic orientation of the expert) were more important for
quality judgements in drama than in ballet or opera.
In this paper, we solely concentrate on quality dimensions that are cor-
estimate of 0.85 for the rate of capacity utilization (loading) that minimizes congestion
and, due to the fact that the marginal provision costs of seat capacity were larger than
the individual marginal congestion costs, a socially optimal loading of 100%.
6related with economic variables. To be more speciﬁc, we assume that qua-
lity has K physically measurable or otherwise quantiﬁable dimensions θk,
k = 1,...,K, which are all positively related to costs. Let ¯ θk denote the
mean quality with respect to dimension k. We choose Qi,k = θi,k/¯ θk and









k = 1. (1)
Due to our deﬁnition of the Qi,k’s, we have — unattached by the dimension
weights νk — Qi = 1 if a theater is of average quality with respect to all K
dimensions.
The marginal use costs of the public facility are negligible. Hence ope-
rating costs are determined by the constructional capacity ¯ Zi of the facility
rather than output in terms of tickets sold Zi, and by quality Qi. We assume









where C0 > 0 is a scaling factor, and ψ1,ψ2 > 0 are the cost elasticities with
respect to quality and capacity, respectively.
Theater Management
In order to model the theater management’s bias towards artistic goals (see
Krebs and Pommerehne 1995), we distinguish between the art director who
sets Qi, and the administrative director who sets the ticket price Pi. Note
that both functions could unite in one person with lexicographic preferences
concerning, in that order, quality and ticket returns. The art director behaves
boundedly rational as her only goal is to satisfy an aspiration level ¯ Q without
7taking into account the city’s budget constraint.9
As capacity is given and quality is out of the administrative director’s
control, her task is simply setting Pi to maximize ticket revenues Ri = PiZi
(i.e. to minimize the facility’s losses). Let Πi denote Ui’s proﬁts:
Πi = PiZi − Ci. (3)
Unfortunately, ticket revenues will generally not suﬃce to cover the relatively
high ﬁxed costs. Thus, the losses of the PAO have to be covered by subsidies.
Like in the case the art director, the administrative director’s rationality
is limited. She takes the spatial structure of her sales area only partly into
account by completely ignoring spatial links between large cities. Hence, the
administrative director acts as if “her” small cities were belonging exclusively
to the consumer belt of her city. In other words, she perceives her city as a
spatial monopolist.
Deﬁnition 4 (Spatial Monopolist) A city Ui is called a spatial monopo-
list if Bi ∩ Bj = ∅∀j ∈ L/i.
Note that the rationality limits of the administrative director result from a
simple miscalculation, which may even be intended, rather than an aspiration
level and that this kind of behavior, therefore, may best be characterized as
“muddling through” (see Blaug 2001).
Both directors are hired by the mayor of the city. For simplicity, we assu-
me that all administrative directors are identical and that there are enough
administrative directors to equip all PAOs. Since quality is costly, the city
9Compare Simon (1955). The aspiration level concept was developed by Lewin and his
collaborators (Lewin et al. 1944). Siegel (1957) deﬁned the level of aspiration as the “least
upper bound of that chord connecting two adjacent points on a (discontinuous) utility
scale that has the maximum slope”.
8hires a speciﬁc art director from a continuum of art directors only if it can
“aﬀord” her aspiration level, and the art director will stay only if she is pro-
vided with enough funds to reach her aspiration level. In the equilibrium,
we therefore have Qi = ¯ Qi ∀ i. The factors that make an aspiration level
aﬀordable for a particular city are not within the scope of our model. It is
assumed, however, that the art director with the least aspiration level would
already overstrain a small city with raising enough tax money to cover their
facilities’ losses. Therefore small cities do not operate own PAOs.
Demand
Let us assume that the administrative director is right in assuming that she
is a spatial monopolist. In order to make the model empirically testable, we
consider in calculating ticket demand the inhabitants of a hypothetical small
















where γ > 0 and, of course, ti ≥ 1.
As citizen have no choice between diﬀerent theaters, they base their de-
cision on whether or not to use “their” theater on the local quality adjusted
consumer price
˜ Pi = Pi ¯ Q
−β
i ti, (6)
with β > 0. Note that the choice of this particular form of the markup factor
best suits our purpose to make the model empirically testable. It implies
9that the elasticity of the local quality adjusted consumer price with respect
to distance increases in distance η ˜ Pi,∆i = γ∆i.
Within the representative city citizens are heterogenous with respect to
their willingness–to–pay for an admission ticket. The WTP is denoted by ζ
and it is assumed that ζ has the density function f(·) and the cumulative
distribution function F(·). Accordingly, the probability that a citizen buys a


















Remember that (7) is valid only if Ui is indeed a spatial monopolist as taken
for granted by the administrative director.
Loss Minimization
In order to compute the revenue maximizing ticket price, we assume that ζ
is either uniformly distributed on the interval [0, ¯ ζ], where ¯ ζ is the maximum































10In the latter case, we have
f(ζ) = λexp(λζ) (12)






















Note that both ¯ ζ/2 and 1/λ represent the mean WTP µ, irrespective of whe-
ther we assume ticket demand to be a linear function as in (11) or unbounded
from above and nonlinear as in (15). Accordingly, we can write
Pexp




Ceteris paribus, PAOs charge higher prices if (i) the mean WTP is higher,
(ii) the quality of their services is better, and (iii) the population lives nearer
to the center of the consumer belt. In both setups, the consumer price equals
the mean WTP
˜ Pi = µ. (17)
There is an interesting relationship between the parameters ψ1 from the
cost function and β from the demand function that would remain valid even
if Zi had to be adjusted for spatial links. Let ηΠ,Q denote the elasticity of the
proﬁts (losses) with respect to quality. It is straightforward to show that
ηΠ,Q

   
   
< 0 if β < ψ1
= 0 if β = ψ1
> 0 otherwise.
(18)
Only in the intermediate case, quality is at its optimum level. If quality is
too low, the marginal cost increase from improving quality is less then what
11could additionally be earned by stimulating demand. Most likely, however,
is the ﬁrst case in which quality is set to a level too high as compared to the
optimum.
So far, we have only modelled what the administrative director believes
to be the demand function. She is right if she actually is a spatial monopolist.
However, if there are spatial links between large cities, (rational) citizens will
commute to that PAO that exhibits the lowest net price as to their location.
Then, expected ticket demand
Zuni















is obviously only an upper bound for actual ticket demand. Moreover, the
PAO will suﬀer unexpected losses.
3 Empirical Test
Empirical Model
We obtain the structural parameters of the cost function by taking the log
of (2), adding an error term ε1,i and estimating
lnCi = lnC0 + ψ1
X
k
νk ln ¯ Qi,k + ψ2 ln ¯ Zi + ε1,i (19)
by OLS. Let ˆ β1,k = d ψ1νk denote the estimated coeﬃcient for quality dimen-
sion k. Due to
P










12For estimating the parameters of the price functional we set up the follo-
wing spatial autoregressive (SAR) model:
lnPi = %Wi lnP
0 + lnµ + β ln ˆ Qi − γ∆
i + ε2,i. (22)
Besides from the term %Wi lnP0, equation (22) is the log of the facility ma-
nager’s price functional (11) or (15), respectively. Irrespective of whether
we assume uniform or exponential preference, estimating the log–version of
either equation gives us an estimate of the mean WTP for tickets ˆ µ. Further-
more, we obtain estimates for the elasticity of the ticket price with respect to
quality ˆ β and distance ˆ γ. Note that in equation (22), the log of the quality
index estimated in
ln ˆ Qi =
X
k
ˆ νk lnQi,k (23)
enters the regression.
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0 ω1,2 ··· ω1,N
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and add up to one row–wise
X
j
ωi,j = 1. (26)
P = (P1,P2,...,PN) is the price vector. Hence, the scalar Wi lnP0 is the
log of the weighted mean ticket price of the neighbors of municipality i. The
13larger the population living in the intersection between the commuter belts
of cities’ i and j, the higher the respective weight.
Since OLS delivers biased and inconsistent estimates, equation (22) was
estimated using Anselins’ (1988) four step procedure.
The Data
The data we used has been drawn from four sources: the statistical year-
book of the German association of performing arts organizations (Deutscher
Buehnenverein 2002), season 2001/02, the statistical yearbook of German
municipalities edited by the German conference of cities (Deutscher Staed-
tetag 2000), the municipal tax rate statistics jointly published by the fe-
deral and state statistical oﬃces (Statistische Aemter des Bundes und der
Laender 2000) and ORTREF, a commercialized data set containing the geo–
coordinates of all German municipalities.
First, we settled diﬀerences between ORTREF and the list of municipali-
ties provided by statistical oﬃces, which were mainly due to amalgamations
of municipalities in East Germany, by matching both data sets by means of
the municipalities’ unique key numbers. This left us with a data set of 13841
German municipalities. For each municipality, we recorded key number, ci-
ty name, population as of June 2000 (Mi and mr, respectively) as well as
longitude (`o) and latitude (`a).
Second, we compiled a data set for all German municipalities exhibiting
at least one PAO. If there was more than one PAO, the respective data was
pooled, i.e., we consider locations rather than single PAOs as we do not
intend do model competition for audience within municipalities. This data
set consists of the capacity ¯ Zi of the PAO (the number of seats multiplied
with the number of performances added up for all PAOs if multiple), the
14number of tickets sold Zi, the number of diﬀerent stagings (NOS), the ope-
rating returns Ri (ticket sale, wardrobe fees and program fees) as well as
operating costs Ci, the average yearly gross wage of a member of the art
personnel (WAP), computed as the total art personnel costs divided by the
size of the art personnel, and the relative share of the total subsidies received
by the PAO that are borne by the taxpayers of the respective municipality
itself (SAD). The statistical yearbook of German municipalities lists for all
German municipalities exhibiting more than 10,000 inhabitants (fortunately,
all municipalities with a PAO have been larger) the following variables that
additionally entered the data set: per capita income tax returns (INC) and
age proﬁle (AGE), computed as the number of people in a old people’s home
over the number of kindergarten places. The data set also contained dummy
variables for East German municipalities, the presence of a university at the
location and the presence of multiple PAOs. Note that we excluded theaters
for children from our data set as competition between theaters for children
and adults is probably very weak if at all. This left us with 137 PAOs at 110
locations.
Then, we programmed an algorithm that computed for each “large”
municipality the prevailing average ticket price Pi (total operating costs
over ticket demand), the distance of a hypothetical average commuter ∆i
according to equation (4) and the weighted ticket price of the neighbors
Wi lnP0. We repeated the algorithm seven times for a maximum reach of
b ∈ {20,25,30,35,40,45,50} kilometers.
Results
First, we report the results of estimating the cost function. Table 1 contains
descriptive statistics of the data entering the regression. We considered three
15quality dimensions in estimating the dimension weights νk and the elasticity
of the costs function with respect to quality ψ1:
1. The giftedness of the actors, as measured by the average gross wage of
the artistic personnel (WAP).
2. The lavishness of the stagings, as measured by population size of the
(POP).
3. The broadness of the repertoire, as measured by the number of diﬀerent
stagings per season (NOS).
As can be taken from the table, the sample mean of WAP was about 52,000e
per year. The average theater city had a population of about 230k. On ave-
rage, on a location not less than 37 diﬀerent stagings were oﬀered per season
(NOS). Furthermore, the average capacity (CAP) was slightly lower than
240k.
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the cost function using OLS with
White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. As can be taken
from the bottom of the table, the overall ﬁt of the regression is satisfactorily
high.
Insert Table 2 about here
As explained above, the weights for giftedness (WAP), lavishness (POP)
and broadness (NOS) add up to one. Broadness is assigned the largest weight
of about 0.6, while giftedness and lavishness, respectively, exhibit a weight
16of about 0.2. However, the estimate for WAP is insigniﬁcant. We attribute
this to the fact that the variance of the average wage of the artistic personnel
is very small (see Table 1) as all engagements at public theaters are subject
to the Normalvertrag Buehne, the collective wage agreement in Germany’s
performing arts sector. For the elasticity of the cost function with respect to
quality (QUA), we obtained an estimate of 0.856, i.e., an increase of quality
by one percent leads to a cost increase of slightly less than one percent.
The estimate for the elasticity of the cost function with respect to capacity
(CAP) shows that a capacity increase generates a cost increase less than
proportional.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the administrative director’s price
functional with the log ticket price lnPi as the endogenous variable. At the
top of the table, the radius of the commuter belt is given, i.e., the maximum
reach of a citizen b. For b < 50, the number of observations (locations) en-
tering the analysis is smaller than 110 as some large cities do not have any
spatial links. For each radius b the table reports the results of four regressi-
ons. Regression I is the initial model without spatial correlation. As it is to
be expected that the mean WTP for a ticket depends on the demographics
of the city, we included in regression II and IV three additional explanatory
variables: income (INC), subsidies (SAD) and age distribution (AGE). The-
se variables entered the regression linearly. Hence, the structural parameter
mean WTP is the product of its components




where D` ∈ {INC,SAD,AGE}, and the estimated parameters µ` are ela-
sticities. Models III and IV include the spatial autoregressive term.
For all regressions, the ﬁt is satisfactorily high. The initial model explains
about 50 % of the variance. Adding the demographics increases the ﬁt by
17some 5 percentage points, while there is only a small increase in the coeﬃcient
of determination when adding the neighbors’ prices.
In all regressions, the mean WTP is positive and signiﬁcant. In model
I it is between 12e and 16e. According to models II and IV the income
elasticity of the WTP for theatrical performances is positive but lower than
unity. An increase in income by 1e leads to an increase of the mean WTP
of about 0.25e. Note that we also tried a dummy variable for the East
German cities in the regression. However, as income is much lower in the East
German cities than in the western part of the country, we had to omit the
dummy for multicollinearity reasons. We expected a negative sign for SAD as
a higher share of subventions to be paid from own tax money should lead to
lower net income and, thus, to lower demand. Indeed, we get a negative sign
for µSAD, but the estimates are insigniﬁcant in all regressions. Econometric
demand studies show that young parents usually do not have the time and
the resources to spend their money on theater tickets. Though insigniﬁcant in
all but three regressions, the estimates for AGE are positive as hypothesized.
Insert Table 3 about here
Quality has a very strong impact on price. ˆ β is signiﬁcant at the 1 % level
in all regressions. Our estimate of about 0.4 suggests that the administrative
director takes a price 0.4 % higher if the art director increases quality by 1
%. Remember that our estimate of the corresponding quality elasticity of the
cost function is given by ˆ ψ1 = 0.856. As ˆ ψ1 > ˆ β (the t test is signiﬁcant at
the 1 % level), we can conclude that the level of quality chosen by the art
director is distinctly too high. The cost increase induced by the last marginal
unit of quality brought about a cost increase more than twice as large as the
corresponding increase in ticket returns.
18The last structural parameter of our model, the distance parameter ˆ γ is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in about half of the regressions and only in
those with relatively small b. Note that γ enters the regression (22) negative-
ly, i.e., the estimated parameters have, except for large b, the right sign. An
estimate of ˆ γ = 0.03 in model I with b = 20 means that the administrative
director would allow for travel costs between 0 % (if all spectators were li-
ving in the city center) and 82 % (if all households were living at the outside
margin of the commuter belt) in ﬁxing the ticket price. The relationship bet-
ween distance and ticket price deteriorates for larger b probably because the
administrative director focusses only on the closest (small) neighbor cities.
The correlation parameter ˆ % is insigniﬁcant for all regressions below a
radius of 35 km. Above that value APC is signiﬁcant in model III (except
for b = 40); but this inﬂuence vanishes if income and the other demographic
variables are taken into account (model IV). Thus, at least for small ma-
ximum reach, we can draw the conclusion that administrative directors do
not fully take into account the spatial dimension of their decision problem.
Though they take into account their clients’ travel costs when calculating
ticket prices, the ignore the fact that other theater managers compete with
them for the same audience. For a large radius of the commuter belt, the
evidence is mixed. In some regression, there is a positive spatial correlation
between ticket prices. A comparison of models III and IV, however, suggests
that price diﬀerences are driven by income diﬀerences rather then the average
ticket price of the neighboring PAOs, i.e., in high–income regions the average
price level is relatively high anyway.
Dummy variables for university towns and cities with multiple PAOs had
to be omitted, since the presence of both a university and several PAOs is
highly correlated with population size and, thus, one of our quality dimensi-
19ons.
It remains to answer the question whether the administrative director’s
failure to recognize that she competes with her colleagues for audience is
economically relevant at all. Obviously, if there are spatial links, which means
that those people who live in the intersections have to choose between two
or more theaters, at least one administrative director will overestimate her
revenue. Three factors inﬂuence demand: ticket price, quality and travel cost.
Let us assume that, for the choice between two or more theaters, travel costs
are irrelevant because all commuters that have a choice live exactly in the
center of the intersection of the commuter belts. Then, those PAOs charging
relatively high quality adjusted ticket prices will experience relatively high
losses.
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 4 lists the average operating loss per oﬀered seat for (real) spatial
monopolists and for competing PAOs that are either cheaper or more ex-
pensive than their neighbors with respect to (a) the ticket price set by the
administrative directors and (b) the quality adjusted ticket price. Analysis of
variance (ANOVA) shows that, in most cases, losses are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one another. Spatial monopolists have the lowest losses per seat. Note
that, as noted above, the number of spatial monopolists decreases as b in-
creases. As hypothesized, competing PAOs that oﬀer their admission tickets
for a price lower than the weighted average of the neighbors, make relatively
low losses. For example, given a maximum reach of 35 km, monopolists on
average suﬀer losses of 52e per seat, cheap competing PAOs exhibit a loss
of 66e per seat and expensive competing PAOs exhibit a loss of almost 93e
per seat. This demonstrates that demand actually reacts to diﬀerences in
20quality and ticket prices. Accordingly, bounded rationality and “muddling
through” on the theater managements’ side can at least partly explain the
size and distribution of losses in the performing arts sector.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a positive analysis of the public provision of the perfor-
ming arts. In our model, agents behave boundedly rational. Art directors set
performance quality according to their aspiration levels. While taking into
account the spatial distribution of the population, administrative directors
in calculating ticket prices ignore that they compete with neighboring per-
forming arts organization (PAOs) for audience. The model has been tested
empirically using a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model with a complete data
set of German PAOs and cities.
Our empirical results suggest that art directors invest too many resources
in quality. As the marginal costs of quality are distinctly higher than the mar-
ginal revenue generated by quality, a general reduction of the level of quality
in the performing arts sector would reduce the sector’s losses (and thus the
necessity to subsidize) signiﬁcantly. It should be noted that our notion of
quality is strictly related to production costs. Hence, a cut in quality invest-
ment does not necessarily mean a loss of esthetic quality or social relevance
of the repertoire. On the whole, we also ﬁnd our hypotheses concerning the
behavior of the administrative directors conﬁrmed. Administrative directors
adjust ticket prices for quality and travel costs but ignore competition. Our
subsequent analysis of the PAOs’ losses has shown that this kind of “mudd-
ling through” behavior is not without economic consequences. Theaters with
relatively high price levels suﬀered higher losses than their neighbors.
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25Tables
Table 1 The Cost Function —
Descriptive Statistics
Label Var Mean Std.Err.
WAP ¯ Q1 52,399e 1,584e
POP ¯ Q2 229,273 37,152
NOS ¯ Q3 37.55 2.62
CAP ¯ Z 239,189 28,439
Table note. n = 110.
26Table 2 The Cost Function — OLS Estimation
Label Parameter Coeﬃcient Std.Err. Sig.Level
SCA ˆ C0 7,431 6,991 .288
WAP ˆ ν1 .193 .156 .217
POP ˆ ν2 .195 .063 .002
NOS ˆ ν3 .612 .135 .000
QUA ˆ ψ1 .856 .113 .000
CAP ˆ ψ2 .635 .076 .000
n = 110 ¯ R2 = .908 F4,105 = 269.65 P(F) = .000
Log–L= −29.568 Breusch–Pagan: χ2
4 = 22.170











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 4 Loss per Ticket by Price — ANOVA
Spatial Cheaper More expensive
b (km) monopolist than neighbors F
20 a 70.24 74.68 78.15 .545
(3.86) (7.32) (5.34)
b 70.24 70.53 86.89 2.417*
(3.86) (6.22) (5.45)
25 a 67.08 71.03 81.43 1.741
(5.36) (5.56) (4.60)
b 67.08 69.15 88.47 4.265**
(5.36) (4.88) (4.69)
30 a 61.68 69.68 83.06 2.952*
(7.89) (4.79) (4.31)
b 61.68 68.20 89.66 6.031***
(7.89) (4.31) (4.31)
35 a 52.18 69.26 82.72 3.446**
(7.66) (4.64) (4.12)
b 52.18 66.26 92.55 10.002***
(7.66) (3.89) (4.61)
40 a 46.13 71.67 79.04 1.781
(12.24) (4.81) (3.63)
b 46.13 68.07 90.47 6.987***
(12.24) (3.91) (4.35)
45 a 68.96 68.90 80.80 1.781
(.) (4.68) (3.83)
b 68.96 67.68 90.02 5.542***
(.) (3.83) (4.50)
50 a — 68.00 82.63 5.461**
(4.55) (3.64)
b — 67.74 90.66 11.594***
(3.74) (4.61)
Table notes. First row: loss per ticket; second row: standard errors.
(a) ticket price; (b) quality adjusted ticket price.
32